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by which to interpret the data. The dances have persisted, although not 
unchanged in form. Did the laws bring about change in religious practice, 
or did they bring resistance, such that Indians exercised control over their 
sacred dances in a period of change? Are the Indians of the period to be 
seen as undermined by European coercion and factionalized by various 
forms of Christianity, such that their opposition was ineffective? Or were 
the religious changes that took place, changes in ritual practices as well as 
loss of status of ritual practitioners, part of more general adaptive changes 
in their mode of life, in which the laws actually played only a relatively 
insignificant part? 
In this book, which happens to be one of the better histories of West- 
ern Canadian Indians of the contact period, European motives for sup- 
pression of ritual are clear; it is the reasons behind the subsequent Indian 
actions that remain rather elusive. 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End of 
the Nineteenth Century. By Blue Clark. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, I994. Xiii + I82 pp., preface, chronology, introduction, illustrations, 
maps, photographs, conclusion, epilogue, appendixes, notes, bibliography, 
index. $37.50 cloth.) 
David C. Williams, Indiana University 
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that Congress may abro- 
gate treaties with the Indian tribes whenever it chooses and may take their 
lands without full compensation. Lone Wolf is thus a significant chapter 
in the expropriation of this continent from its indigenous owners. Along 
with Dred Scott and Korematsu, the case is one of the low points of judicial 
protection of minority rights. Blue Clark has now written a case study of 
this important decision. In this slim volume, he traces the background of 
Kiowa-U.S. relations, the abrogation of the i867 Medicine Lodge treaty 
by Congress, the Supreme Court's acceptance of that abrogation, and the 
aftereffects of that decision on the Kiowas and other Indian groups. 
To those familiar with the case, it is most useful to see the story from 
beginning to end, told in detail and in context. In particular, we come to 
know the intriguing personalities that drove this case through litigation: 
Lone Wolf, the defiant representative of aboriginal Kiowa culture; Indian 
Agent Randlett, the federal bureaucrat who paternalistically tried to care 
for his charges but would brook no defiance; Herbert Welsh, the head of 
the Indian Rights Association, who sought to protect Indian land rights 
but also to assimilate the tribes; and of course the lawyers-Willis Van 
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Devanter, Hampton Carson, and William Springer. By tracing the vary- 
ing agendas of these participants, Clark offers us a fascinating story of the 
politics of Indian rights at the turn of the century. 
Ultimately, however, this book is not about politics but about law, 
and in particular about one case-Lone Wolf. It is therefore unfortunate 
that Clark's treatment of that case rests on basic legal errors. After Clark's 
analysis of the case, we still do not know what the Court held, what the 
exact significance of the holding was, or how that holding differs from 
present law. 
Some background may be helpful. In i867 the Kiowas and the United 
States signed the Treaty of Medicine Lodge, setting aside a reservation for 
the tribe and agreeing that any future cessions of land would occur only 
with the consent of three-quarters of the tribe's male members. In I892 the 
Jerome Commission secured from the Kiowas an additional agreement: 
the tribal common lands would be allotted to individual Kiowas to be 
held in fee simple, and the federal government would buy some of the re- 
mainder. As Clark describes, the federal government failed to obtain the 
number of signatures required by the i867 treaty, and the amount paid for 
the land was very low. In i900, Congress adopted this agreement, with 
modification, as a statute. 
The Court in Lone Wolf faced two legal issues, not one. First, the 
Kiowas alleged that the United States could not unilaterally violate its 
treaties; agreements between nations were binding, just as are contracts 
between parties (the "Sanctity of Treaty" claim). Second, the United States 
had recognized Indian title to the reservation in the treaty, so that there- 
after the land was protected against government expropriation by the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, just as all other land is (the 
"Just Compensation" claim). Clark never distinguishes between these two 
claims; he routinely treats the Just Compensation claim as if it were one as- 
pect of the Sanctity of Treaty claim. This conflation causes him to confuse 
the holding of the case and its significance. 
The practical differences between the two claims are many. First, the 
Just Compensation claim would protect only land rights, whereas the Sanc- 
tity of Treaty claim would protect any treaty rights, including sovereignty. 
Second, the Sanctity of Treaty claim would completely block the United 
States from taking Kiowa land: by contrast, the Just Compensation claim 
would require the United States only to pay a fair amount for any land that 
it chose to take. Clark completely ignores this fact; he seems to assume that 
if the Kiowas won, they would automatically get their land back. Third, 
under modern law, the Kiowas would probably win on the Just Compensa- 
tion claim but lose on the Sanctity of Treaty claim: the federal government 
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may freely abrogate its government-to-government agreements, but it must 
pay for land that it takes (see United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 
U.S. 37I, 4I0-I5 [i980]). Clark asserts that modern legal opinion holds 
that Lone Wolf is "outmoded" (I07); in fact, modern legal opinion holds 
that it is outmoded only as to the Just Compensation rule, not as to the 
Sanctity of Treaty rule. 
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the elision of the two claims 
causes Clark to misrepresent the Court's reasoning. Each claim rested on 
different arguments, considerations, and precedents. On the Sanctity of 
Treaty issue, the Court held that Congress could violate Indian treaties at 
whim. It offered two legal reasons, and again Clark never adequately dis- 
tinguishes between these two grounds. First, according to the Court, Indian 
affairs were a Political Question. Clark recapitulates this part of the hold- 
ing but never explains its legal meaning: it means, technically, that Indian 
affairs are nonjusticiable, that is, that judges will not review congressional 
action in this field at all because control over this field is committed to 
congressional discretion. The Court reached this conclusion on the racist 
ground that Indians were helpless and inferior and therefore needed the 
unrestricted guidance of their guardian, Congress (see Lone Wolf v. Hitch- 
cock, I87 U.S. 553, 564-68 [I903]). In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
abandoned this view: Indian affairs are no longer a political question (see 
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 2z6, 248-50 [I985]). 
The other reason for rejecting the Sanctity of Treaty claim is, how- 
ever, more compelling: the most recent word of Congress on a subject, 
whether expressed in statute or treaty, controls (see Lone Wolf, I87 U.S. 
at 565-66). The basis for this last-in-time doctrine is simple-democracy. 
A past Congress may not restrain a present Congress, because to do so 
would be to restrict the present will of the majority. To do that, we must 
pass a constitutional amendment; ordinary legislation or treaties will not 
do. Congress generally should not abrogate its treaties, to be sure, but if it 
does, the Court may not stop it without great damage to the democratic 
process. As a result, long before Lone Wolf came down, the Court had held 
that Congress may abrogate treaties in general. Lone Wolf simply applied 
this general rule to Indian treaties in particular. There are, then, strong 
reasons for the last-in-time rule, and it remains in effect today (see Sioux 
Nation, 448 U.S. at 4I0-Ii, n. 27). One may reject these reasons generally 
or particularly in the field of Indian affairs, but unhappily Clark never dis- 
cusses them, nor does he make any attempt to situate Lone Wolf in the area 
of general treaty doctrine. 
With regard to the Kiowas' Just Compensation claim, the Court found 
itself faced with two legal ideas that were somewhat in opposition. On 
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the one hand, the federal government is under a fiduciary duty to manage 
the tribes' property in their best interest. As a result, the federal govern- 
ment has the right to change the form of the Indians' property (e.g., selling 
some of the land to buy livestock), so long as that decision is made for the 
good of the Indians. On the other hand, under the Fifth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, the federal government is forbidden to take Indian land 
without just compensation. In short, the federal government may manage 
the tribes' land but not take it. Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell 
the difference, and we need some guidance to make the determination in 
individual cases (see Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407-9). 
In Lone Wolf, the federal government had given the tribes some money 
in exchange for the land, but there was a serious allegation that the money 
was inadequate and that the deal was a taking in disguise, not an effort 
to manage the land in good faith. The Kiowas' case here was quite strong, 
and there was a hope that the Court might have found for them on this 
claim. The Lone Wolf Court, however, perfunctorily rejected the claim, on 
the grounds that the Court "must presume that Congress acted in perfect 
good faith" and that Indian affairs were a political question, immune from 
judicial review (see Lone Wolf, I87 U.S. at 568). Again, the modern Court 
has rejected this rule: it has promised, instead, to review carefully every act 
of Congress to ensure that Congress acted as a good fiduciary (see Sioux 
Nation, 448 U.S. at 4I4-i6). 
Unfortunately, almost none of this analysis appears in Clark's book. 
He never mentions the fiduciary doctrine or considers its tension with the 
Just Compensation clause. As a result, he fails to recognize the fundamen- 
tal issue here: how do we distinguish between federal management and 
takings of Indian land? For the same reason, he also fails to recognize 
that Lone Wolf is legally so egregious primarily because it presumed Con- 
gressional good faith in the management of Indian land-not because it 
allowed Congress to abrogate Indian treaties. Finally, he fails to recognize 
that the Just Compensation claim would have secured only more money 
for the tribe, not their land. 
Indeed, Clark's whole description of Lone Wolf ignores basic legal dis- 
tinctions. He begins with the Court's observation that Congress has the 
power to abrogate (relevant to the Sanctity of Treaty doctrine). Without 
pause-as if he is discussing the same issue-he then asserts that Lone Wolf 
set up a "good faith effort" test: the Just Compensation clause requires 
only that Congress try in good faith to give the tribes market value (7I). In 
fact, Lone Wolf did not set up such a test; rather, it presumed good faith. 
Modern cases do set up a "good faith" test, and Clark would appear to 
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be reading these back into Lone Wolf. In any event, this whole discussion 
concerns the Just Compensation clause, not the Sanctity of Treaty claim. 
Again without pause, Clark goes back to the Sanctity of Treaty claim 
to mention the last-in-time rule, but within the same paragraph he has re- 
turned to Just Compensation concerns: he asserts that the Lone Wolf Court 
held that "there was really no treaty violation" (the Sanctity of Treaty issue) 
because the federal government was merely managing the property (the 
Just Compensation issue). He then quotes from the Court's holding that 
Indian affairs fall under the Political Question doctrine because Indians are 
inferior and helpless. At this point, he asserts that the Court confronted an 
irony: because a majority of the tribal members signed the I892 agreement, 
it would be undemocratic to reject it, even though the i867 treaty required 
three-quarters agreement. The Court's response to this troubling issue, ac- 
cording to Clark, was to take refuge in the Political Question doctrine. In 
fact, however, there is no evidence at all that the justices were troubled 
by any such irony. In the body of the opinion, they never mention that 
a majority of the tribe had signed the agreement, nor do they ever reveal 
any discomfort with the thought of flouting the will of a tribal majority 
(71-72). 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, to be sure, is not an easy case to understand, 
but all the foregoing is basic black letter law in this field. The failure of 
this slim volume to reproduce accurately the holding and reasoning of the 
case must therefore be accounted a serious deficiency. That deficiency is all 
the greater because Clark maintains a constant tone of outrage toward the 
Lone Wolf Court. Outrage is appropriate in my view, but if we are going to 
be outraged, we should first seek to understand what the Court really did 
and to enter the justices' mental universe long enough to get some sense of 
the terrain. 
Ultimately, however, the weakness of this work reflects the failure 
of Indian law itself. Federal Indian law controls the lives of many tribal 
communities to a unique degree, and yet Indian law is uncommonly in- 
accessible, not only to the general public but even to lawyers. As long as 
Indian law has this arcane, forbiddingly technical quality, tribal members 
will not generally be able to understand the rules governing their lives. As a 
result, they will remain disempowered, denied control of their own future. 
Sadly, neither courts nor Congress nor Indian law commentators have done 
much to render the field more accessible to nonlawyers. Clark's errors are 
therefore somewhat understandable, and the custodians of the legal system 
must bear some of the blame for them. Nonetheless, they are errors, and 
they are therefore a part of the problem. This work does not help make 
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Indian law more accessible; it adds to the confusion. With the best inten- 
tions in the world, Clark protests the disempowerment of Indian tribes, 
but he inadvertently contributes to it. 
Southern Cheyenne Women's Songs. By Virginia Giglio. (Norman: Uni- 
versity of Oklahoma Press, I994. XXi + 243 pp., preface, introduction, 
illustrations, maps, figures, song transcriptions, photographs, appendixes, 
glossary, bibliography, index. $29.95 cloth.) 
Catherine Price, Palo Alto College 
In Southern Cheyenne Women's Songs, Virginia Giglio demonstrates that 
Cheyenne women have taken a leadership role both in preserving tradi- 
tional Cheyenne songs and in experimenting with new musical expressions. 
Giglio is careful to remind the reader that the completion of this fascinating 
and scholarly work on Cheyenne music could not have been possible with- 
out the expertise of her Cheyenne friends, talented women such as Diane 
Hawk and Joan Swallow. Deeply respectful of the Southern Cheyenne's 
belief that all musical expression has a sacred center, Giglio was careful to 
ensure before proceeding that her research project would be acceptable to 
the Southern Cheyenne people. Moreover, the author wove historical and 
cultural sketches into the fabric of song analysis. "I didn't want to know 
only about the music," she writes, "I wanted to know the people" (xviii). 
Thus the reader follows the Cheyenne people from some of the earliest 
encounters with whites in i68o to the modern-day powwow. 
Armed with a copy of Frances Densmore's Cheyenne and Arapaho 
Music, drawn from Densmore's research among the Southern Cheyenne in 
I935, Giglio traveled to several Oklahoma Cheyenne communities nearly 
sixty years later to record a variety of songs customarily sung by Cheyenne 
women to their children, during hand games and "giveaways," at cere- 
monies to honor male and female veterans, and during spiritual gatherings. 
Furthermore, for each of the thirty-two songs chosen for analysis, Giglio 
includes a musical transcription, the Cheyenne lyrics as they would be spo- 
ken and as they are sung, followed by both literal and free translations of 
the song in English. 
Through her research, Giglio succeeded in questioning the assump- 
tions of earlier scholars. Frances Densmore, for instance, concluded that 
the Cheyenne people did not sing lullabies to their babies, "as the crooning 
to little children is not dignified by the name of singing" (85). Yet Giglio 
recorded several popular lullabies, including one that consultant Bertha 
Little Coyote sang to her own son in I93I. In addition, Giglio analyzed 
